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THE NETHERLANDS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 
FROM 'PRO' TO 'NO'
When you break it, you own it!
On lst June 2005, 61.6% of the Dutch electorate rejected the draft European Consti­
tution. It was for the first time in Dutch parliamentary history that a referendum was 
organized. Together with the French, who had also torpedoed the Constitution, the 
Dutch stalled the progress of further European Integration.:
In April 2006, the Italian Prime Minister Prodi pleaded for a core group of 
‘Pro-European nations’ that would take the lead in the further integration of Europę2. 
This group would include all EU’s founder-countries, except the Netherlands. By 
itself, Prodi’s remark had no direct political implicatións, and withiń a few days the 
Italian Prime Minister tried to calm down the agitated Dutch politicians by claiming 
he had been misąuoted. But still, the image remained that the Dutch were obstructing 
further European integration and should not be regarded anytnore as one of the mo- 
tors behind European integration. .
This February it was Barroso, Chairman of the European Commissión, who 
subtly urged the Dutch Govemment to move towards a more proactive approach to 
the problems caused by the Dutch ‘no’. Bairoso emphasized the fact that in 2004, the 
Dutch govemment signed the Constitution Treaty. This means that the govemment 
has a responsibility to have the treaty ratified.
‘ Rob Veriio£śtad M.Sc., Lecturer in Political Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands; Manager 
■ ofthe International Office, Nijmegen School of Management, Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.
2 B: L a n t i n g, EU-kopgroep werki alleen maar averechts, “Yolkskrant”, 19 April 2006:
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Many commentators jand politicians from other European countries expressed 
their concem over the reluctant attitude the Dutch displayed to solve the problems 
they had caused. As in the Pottery Barn rule: “When you break it, you own it!”
Dutch Ambivalent attitude towards Europę: the electorate
The Dutch populatioń seems to be confused about Europę. Now, after the referen­
dum, we know that the majority of the electorate is against the European Constitu­
tion, but how exactly should we interpret this ‘no’ vote? In many newspapers the 
outcome is interpreted as a proof of an emerging Euro skepticism in the Netherlands, 
but the results of several surveys studying the Dutch attitude towards Europę point at 
another conclusion.
The Eurobarometer measures the public opinion of the European populatioń 
on various topics. In these surveys, the Dutch respondents coritinuously have shown 
a elear support for the European Union over the years. An indicator for support can 
be found in the answers to the ąuestion whether-the respondent thinks that the EU 
membership is ą good thing or not3. Without exception the Dutch respondents were 
far more positive than the European average (Table 1).
Table 1. EU Membership is a good thing ;
1976 spring , 1986 spring . 1996 spring 2006 autumn
Netherlands ; 75 83 . 78 72
European average 53 62 ■ -: • 53 ' 53 •
The same can be said about the response to the ąuestion if the EU membership 
is beneficial for the country or not4 (Table 2).
Table 2. EU Membership is beneficial for our country
- 1986 spring ' 1996 spring 2006 autumn
Netherlands -  • 68^ \ r  64 '• 62
European average .. IW ■ 46 42 54 f t.v
There seems to be a constańt level of support for the European Union as such. 
No drop in support was measured in the period after the referendum on the constitu­
tion. On the contrary, there is a slight inerease in the trust Dutch people have in 
(European) democracy. The explanation for this is that the electorate noticed that 
their voting behaviour mattered and madę a difference5. Looking at these outeomes
3 The Question in the Eurobarometer survey was: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) 
membership of the European Union is a good thing?’
4 The Question in the Eurobarometer survey was: ‘Taking everytliing into eonsideration. would you say 
that (our country) has on balance benefited fróm being a member of the European Union or nót?|
s Forum, Yerkiezingstijd goed moment voor visie op Europa, “Yolkskrant”, 1 June 2006.
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we cannot come to the conclusion that the ‘no’ vote coincides with, or is indicating 
an increase in Euro Skepticism6. •
Dutch Ambivalent attitude towards Europę: the political elite
Before 2005, ‘Europę’ was never really an important political issue in the Nether- 
lands. The issue of Europę was more or less depoliticised, hidden under a blanket of 
consensus. Ever sińce elections to the European Parliament; are held, the voter tum- 
out has been lower then in national; local and;even district elections7. Europę has 
never played a major role in parliamentary. election campaigns. Even major devel- 
opments, like the 2004 enlargement of the union, the treaty of Maastricht, the intro- 
duction of the Euro occurred without much political struggle or debate.
Over the: years, the gap between the political elite and the electorate over 
Europę grew. If the parliament would have decided over the European Constitution it 
would have been ratified without any doubt (127, members. of Parliament were in. 
favour, 22 were against, one member could not make up his mind). However, it was 
decided that a referendum was to be organised.
The parties represented in the government coalition at that time (CDA, VVD, 
D66), as well as the largest opposition party (PvdA) and a smaller opposition party 
(GroenLinks) tried to,explain to the electorate why they should support the Constitu­
tion. They did not find the right tone, nor the convincing arguments, contrary to the 
parties that attacked the Constitution (SP, CU, LPF, SGP and Group Wilders).
Among the parties that supported the Constitution, a gap emerged between 
party elites and their electorate (Table 3). The electorate of PvdA and VVD disagreed 
with the pro-Constitution campaign of their leaders and there was only a slight major- 
ity o f‘pro’ voters iń the electorate of the other three parties that were in favour for the 
Constitution. .
Question: How did you vote in the referendum?8
TOTAL CDA PvdA W D GroenLinks D66
YES 38 53 37 49 54 . 51
NO 62 47 63 51 46 49
4 This conclusion is supported by the outcome of a large scalę suryey perfonned by the Dutch govemment
as a reaction to the referendum; According to this survey no less than 65 per cent of the respondents support the
EU-membership (source: Nederlandineuropa.nl. Executive summary.July 2006, The Hague).
7 The lowest voter tumout for the European Parliament so far was 30.0% in 1999 (source: CBS, statistics
Netherlands, www.cbs.nl). ' ■ .•
8 European Commission, The European Constitution: post-referendum suryey in the Netherlands, Brussels
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Why did people vote no?
Right after the Referendum, commentators and analysts tried to explain the rejection 
ofthe Constitution. The European Commission brdered a post-referendum survey to 
find answers9. The many articles and surveys published after the referendum gave 
insight into the arguments the electorate had used to vote against the Constitution. 
Interestingly, most of these arguments were only indirectly related to the Constitution 
itself: a) lack of information, b) the introduction of the Euro in 2002, c) the net contri- 
bution to the European Union, d) the diminishing influence within the EU as a result of 
the enlargement, e) futurę enlargement, and f) domestic disenchantment.
There is a logical explanation for the fact that most of the arguments men- 
tioned above are not directly related tó the European Constitution, sińce this was the 
first occasion for the Dutch electorate to directly express its opinion on a European 
issue. It seems that the Dutch electorate took this opportunity to broaden the ąuestion 
and include many other European elements and issues as well.
a) Lack o f information
The EU post-referendum survey indicates that lack; of information was the main 
cause for the ‘no’ vote. No less then 32% of the participants in this survey names 
lack of information the reason to vote ‘no’10. The ‘NederlandinEuropa.nl ’-survey 
indicates that only 21% of the respondents felt ‘well informed’ about Europę11.
It is remarkable that lack of information proves to be the top ranking argument 
to vote against the Constitution, sińce information was available in all the feasible 
forms. The text of the constitution was available in Dutch in printed versions as well 
as on the internet, and every eligible voter was sent a brochure witli a summary of 
the text to their homes. Furthermore, all the media paid plenty of attention to the 
Constitution and covered arguments both for and against. ; 1 -
Neyertheless, the. ąuestion whether all this information eliminated the distrust 
to what this Constitution would really mean for the Dutch remains. When the re­
spondents label: ‘lack of information’ one of the main reasons to vote against the . 
Constitution, they might mean that they were not convinced why they should vote in 
favour ofthe Constitution. The EU post-referendum survey shows that 5% ofthe : 
respondents explicitly give this reason for their ‘no’ vote12. Besides this, 50% ofthe 
Dutch think that a European Constitution is not essential to pursue European Con- 
struction13.
9Ibidem.
' 10 European Commission, The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in the Netherlands, Brus-
sels2005,p. 15.
11 Nederlandineuropa.nl. Executive summaiy, July 2006, The Hague.
12 European Commission, The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in the Netherlands, Brus- 
sels2005,p. 15.
a Ibidem, p. 21.
THE NETHERLANDS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.. 211
b) The introduction ofthe Euro in 2002 
There is no link whatsoever between the introduction of the Euro in 2002 and the 
draft Constitution. But still, the disenchantment oyer the Euro echoed in the referen­
dum. The Dutćh populatioń has an overall negative feeling towards the adoption of 
the Euro. A Eurobarometer survey14 shows that the Dutch are more negative about 
the Euro then the European average. Only 38% ofthe respondents think there has 
been an overall advantage, 43% perceive an overall disadvantage.
According to 90.5% of Dutch respondents, the introduction of the Euro caused 
pnce increase. The European average for the belief that prices increased as a result of 
introduction ofthe Euro is 81.0%15. Objectively, however, there is less reason for the 
Dutch to complain then for the average European citizen. For the last three years, the 
Dutch inflation rate has been much lower then the average inflation rate in the Euro­
zone. Since 2003, prices in the Netherlands have increased by 4.8%, while the aver- 
age price increase in the countries of the Eurozone was 6.9%16. These figures do not 
take away the belief deeply rooted in the Netherlands that we are worse off with the 
Euro than we were with the Guilder before 2002. The respondents seem to underes- 
timate the positive conseąuences of the single currency for the Netherlands: ah open 
economy with intemational trade as one of the most important economical sectors. .
c) Net contribution to the EU
Until 1993, the Netherlands liad often been a net benefactor of the EU. Mainly be- 
cause of the massive agricultural subsidies the Netherlands received more money 
than they paid into EU’s budget; But sińce that time the contribution óf the Nether­
lands is greater than its retums. The Dutch govemment disagrees with the European 
Commission about what definition should be used to determine the net contribution. 
Contrary to the European Commission, the Dutch govemment believes that the cus- 
tom-tax from the Rotterdam harbour should be included in the calculations17. In the 
light of this definition, the Dutch paid € 194 per capita in 2004 (which is 0.68% of 
the GDP), the highest amount per capita in Europę. According to the calculation 
made by the EU, the Dutch have a net contribution of € 125 per capita (which is 
0.44% GDP). Even if the EU definition is taken into account, the Dutch pay the 
highest net contribution per capita18; Since 2007, the Netherlands has benefited from 
a reduction in their contribution of € 1 billion. This was the result óf the negótiations 
among European govemment leaders in December 2005.
Prime Minister Balkenende pleaded for this reduction using the ‘no’ vote on 
the referendum as an argument. In 2007, the Dutch are still making the highest net
14 European Commission, The Eurozone, 5 years after the introduction o f  Euro coins and banknotes; ana- 
lytical report, Drusscls 2006. ' :
IJ Ibidem, pp. 30,91.
16 J. W alschots, G van S teeg, Inflatie Nederland at drie jaar lager dan eurozone, webmagazine 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistieken, 2006.
17 G G elauff, H. S to lw ijk , -P. V eenendaal, CPB-document, Europe's financial perspectives in 
perspective, The Ilaguc 2005.
18 Ministery of Finance, website: press release, DeNederlandse nettopositie en het 'Rotterdam-effect, 2005.
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contribution according to their definition, but according to the EU-definition the 
Dutch pay about the average net contribution.
d) Diminishing influence within the EU
Ule Dutch are one ofthe six ‘founding fathers’ of European integration. In 1951, the 
Dutch, together with France, Germany; Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg, signed the 
treaty ofthe European Coal and Steel Community, normally regąrdcd as the first step 
towards European integration. Even when the group of cooperating countries ex- 
panded, the Dutch managed to retain a greater influence in Europę than the country’s 
size would justify. More than ever, the Dutch lost their political influence after the 
enlargement of 2004, when no less than 10 countries accessed the European.Union. 
After 2004, the Dutch were only one of 25 members, and not even a big one. Fur- 
thermore, the bonus of being one ofthe ‘founding fathers’ gradually faded, espe- 
cially sińce many ofthe new members have a different background. Until only a few 
years ago, many of the new members were still part of the Warsaw Pact19. For this 
reason, they do not share the same European history as the i‘old’ ; members experi- 
enced, and tend not to reward the Dutch for the important role they played in estab- 
lishing the common European project. > 1 /■
Besides, being afraid that the Netherlands loses influence to other member 
states, the respondents of the post referendum survey also mention that they fear a 
loss of national sovereignty. Following ‘lack of information’, this fear ranks second 
in the list of reasons why people voted ‘no’ at the referendum20. Another complaint 
was that all these changes happened far too fast. At least every other respondent be- 
lieves that the speed of change within the EU has been too high?1.
e) Futurę enlargement
Before the enlargement of the EU.in 2004, the Dutch were more positive about ac- 
cession of new member states than the average European. Over the years, the Dutch 
have become less enthusiastic about fiirther enlargement. In 2006, a minority of 45% 
was in fayour of further enlargement, a figurę slightly lower than the European aver- 
age (46%)22. The Dutch fear a further decrease of political; influence within the 
European Union as well as an inerease of their net contribution. The possible futurę 
entry of Turkey played an important role in the referendum campaign. People oppos- 
ing the Constitution pointed at the enormous size of the country and wamed for the 
extra costs its accession would incur. Besides the economical and political arguments 
against the accession of Turkey, other issues were raised as well. Turkey with its 
Muslim background might disturb the Christian-Judaic culture of Europę. For some 
segments óf the Dutch population this would be undesirable. The issue of multicul-
19 With the entrance of Romania and Bułgaria on 1 January 2007, now all former Warsaw Pact countries
outside the Soviet Union are member of the EU. ‘ ,
20 European Commission, 77ie European Constitution: post-referendum suryey in the Netherlands, Brus-
sels2005,p. 15. L.,:. ..
, 21 Nederlandineuropa.nl: 53% of the respondents find the rate of change in the European Union too rapid; 
13% too slow. - ■ \  . ■ .
22 European Commission, Eurobarometer 66, public opinion in the European Union. Bmssels, Autumn2006.
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turalism has for a few years dóminated the political agenda in the Netherlands. Espe- 
cially after the murder ofthe political leader Fortuyn and the cineaste van Gogh, the 
religious and cultural tensions increased.
* Within the conservative party VVD, the ąuestion whether Turkey could join 
the European Union in the near futurę or not, led to a clash, when MP Wilders re- 
fused to abide by the official party’s position to support it. As a result, Wilders left 
his party but kept the seat in the Parliament to become one of the most pronounced 
critics of the European Constitution, employing the possible accession of Turkey to 
the EU as the ‘horror scenario’. According to the survey organised by Nederlandi- 
nEuropa.nl, a majority of 52% do not want Turkey to be a member ofthe EU, even if 
the country met all the conditions for the entry.
f) Domestic disenchantment
At the time of the referendum the govemment coalition led by Prime Minister Bal- 
kenende faced a very Iow approval rate. In opinion polis the govemment coalition 
lost 20 seats of the 78 they had in the Parliament. All three parties of the coalition 
lost seats in the polis23. The govemment was unpopular because of its painful politi­
cal reforms in order to improve the economic situation. According to the EU post 
referendum survey, 14% ofthe yoters named domestic disenchantment as a reason to 
vote ‘no’24.
After the Constitution
After the referendum, the Dutch govemment introduced a period of reflection, just as 
the European Commission did after the ‘no’ votes in France and the Netherlands. 
The Dutch govemment organised public debates to discuss the futurę of the Dutch 
role in the EU, and carried out a large-scale survey in order to understand the public 
.opinion. :
■ The Dutch govemment tried to conciliate the critical populatioń by .playing 
hard bali in Brussels over financial issues conceming contribution and subsidies. In 
2005, they were very successful in reducing the contribution, but at the same time 
fed the skeptical attitude of the populatioń towards the EU.
The Dutch govemment interpreted the ‘no’ given in the referendum as a signal 
that the Dutch populatioń felt estranged from the process of European integration25. 
Europę, for that reason, must have benefits that are more clearly visible to the Dutch, 
and there should be a clearer distinction between issues that can be dealt with at the 
national level and issues that reąuire a European approach. Furthermore, the Nether­
lands asked for a cautious approach to further enlargement.
23 Websitc: Politieke baromcter.nl; last poll before the referendum on Ist June 2005: 27th May 2005. CDA 
33 seats (44 in parliament), VVD: 21 (28 in parliament), D66: 4 (6  in parliament).
24 European Commission, The European Constitution: post-referendum survey in the Netherlands, Brus­
sels 2005, p. 15.
25 B. B o t, Minister of foreign affairs, Staat van de Europese Unie 2006-2007, Letter to the Parliament, 19 
September 2006.
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; Right after the referendum, not only the coalition parties but most other politi­
cal parties as well ąuickly changed their opinion on the EU towards a more skeptical 
and critical approach, because they were afraid to alienate the electorate further.
Contrary to what one might expect after the political turmoil of the referen­
dum, Europę did not play ari important role in the parliamentary election campaign in 
November 2006. For most political parties it was difficult to explain their śudden 
change on the European issue. For those parties that maintained their pro-Europe atti­
tude it was risky to face the electorate that had so clearly said ‘no’ to the Constitution.
Apparently. contrary to the political establishment! the electorate did not forget 
the ąuestion of Europę. All five parties that had supported the Constitution (CDA, 
PvdA, W D , D66, GroenLinks) lost seats in the election of 2006. It goeś without 
saying that there may have been other explanations for this loss as well, but most 
analyses of the election results suggested a correlation26. The parties that took the 
lead in the ‘no’ campaign won multiple seats (the Socialist Party increased its posi- 
tion from 8 to 25 seats, the Christian Union from 3 to 6 seats, and PVV (Wilders) 
from 1 to 9 seats).
The Netherlands and the EU, now and in the futurę
The Dutch govemment claims that the gap between the EU and its people is not just 
a Dutch phenomenon, but a Union-wide problem. Bot, the Dutch Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in the previous govemment, strongly disagreed with the label o f ‘Euroskep- 
tics’, claiming that ‘Eurocritical’ would be a better term to describe the attitude of 
both the Dutch people and govemment27. Still there is criticism of other member 
states about the somewhat passive approach of the Dutch govemment after the 2005 
referendum. Ever sińce the French and Dutch voters rejected the Constitution in their 
referenda, Europę has been stymied. Most member states have already ratified the 
treaty, but rejection ofthe Treaty by only one member State, blocks the Constitution. 
The Dutch govemment felt the pressure to break the stalemate, but there were several 
probiems preventing an casy way out:
First; a new cabinet was formed in February 2007. As usual, the cabinet was 
formed by a coalition of different political parties. The current govemment includes 
two parties that were in favour of the Constitution'(CDA and PvdA), but also one 
junior member (Christian Union) that was prominently against the Constitution. 
Maybe it is because of this political disagreement that there was no elear comment 
about the futurę of the European Constitution in the govemment’s policy statement.
Another problem is that Europę, or more specifically the European Constitu- 
tion, played hardly any role in the election campaign28. Most political parties did not
26 W .M unchau, The Dutch are leading a popular rebellion, “The Financial Times”, 27 November 2006.
27 B. B o t, Niet eurosceptisch, maar eurokritisch; Nederlandse regering doolt niet zonder kompas rond in
het laagland, “NRCHandelsblad”, 31 May 2006. ; ; , .
28 O. R uding, Urgenle onderdelen EU-grondwet behoeven ahnog uitvoering, “Volkskrant”, 28 November 
2006. r- ' . ■ , k \
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express clearly what they thought should happen with the European Constitution. 
The cabinet struggled with two altemative options, neither. of them very attractive.
The first option, to hołd another referendum about the altered version of the 
Constitution, was favoured by PvdA and Christian Union, as well as by most of the 
opposition parties. From the democratic point of view this seemed a logical thing to 
do. The people rejected the first version, so let them decide if the second version 'is 
acceptable or not. But only if the proposal were much different from the original one 
from 2005, a majority of the people might support it. However, there is absolutely no 
guarantee for a ‘yes’. As mentioned earlier, there are many. other arguments and sen- 
timents determining voting behaviour in a referendum like this.
The other option, supported strongly by CD A, was to have enough changes in 
tne second proposal to make another referendum unnecessary. Therefore the pro­
posal ofthe Constitution had to be tuned down to a normal European treaty similar to 
the many we had in the past. There was a lot ofpressure exerted by other member 
states on the Netherlands to avoid another referendum with all the risks of a second 
rejection. Its brunt was felt most strongly by Prime Minister Balkenende and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Verhagen (both from CDA).
Tlie Netherlands was not the only country who seriously hesitated about the 
Constitution as propbsed in 2005. More countries wanted changes, and behind closed 
doors a new proposal was being prepared. The semantic changes might have been 
the most important ones. The word ‘Constitution’ was surrendered, as well as the 
European anthem and flag.Tnstead of a new Constitution replacing former treaties, 
the new proposal was called a treaty, adding seyeral elements to the existing ones. To 
some there is hardly any real political difference between the first and second pro­
posal. One difference is that the new proposal is totally unreadable compared to the 
draft for the Constitution because it refers to numerous former treaties rather than 
replacing them by a new text. Countries that already ratified the Constitution tend to 
minimise the differences between the two proposals. In the Netherlands, however, 
the Cabinet emphasises the changes.
On 21st September 2007, the Dutch cabinet decided that there will be no refer­
endum about the new treaty29. The cabinet follows the advisory opinion issued by the 
Council of State30. The formal argument is that, the new EU treaty will have no im­
pact on the national constitution, contrary to the first proposal. Besides this formal 
argument, the cabinet suggested that a referendum was not needed, sińce the second 
proposal awarded the objeętions put forward by the people in the referendum in 
2005. This second argument is disputable, sińce we can only guess why exactly peo­
ple rejected the Constitution. Studies to find out what the ‘no’ meant, and how it 
needs to be interpreted result in a very complek set of objections. It is impossible to 
confirm that this second proposal takes away all or most of these objections. ;
Now, after the Treaty of Lisbon was signed on 27 October, its is the Dutch 
Parliament that will decide about the ratification. Many will surely see this a blow to
291. T raynor, Dutch PMfaces defeat over EU treaty vote: Referendum issue splits country and coalition, 
“Guardian”, 22 September 2007.
30 European Report, Treaty o f Lisbon: Ratifications could start in December already, 23 October 2007.
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deniocracy. It indicates that the Dutch govemment is willing to ask the people’s 
opinion, but will only respect the decision as long as it finds it convenient. It will not 
be very helpful for the somewhat problematic relation between the political elite and 
the people. This gap is not uniąue for the Netherlands. A recent survey showed that 
in the five large member states there is a vast majority in favour of organizing a ref­
erendum about the Lisbon treaty, varying from 63% in France to 76% in Germany31. 
The political leaders however will do anything to prevent any more referenda. In 
Lisbon, the political leaders of the 27 member states finally agreed on a new treaty. 
But the disagreement between them and their people is certainly not diminishing.
One way or another, there will be a treaty. This is not the first time that Europę 
has faced problems conceming further integration or enlargement. SoT far- Europę 
always survived these problems, eveń the far more trying ones. However, the under- 
iying problems cannot be denied. The Netherlands is not the only European country 
where people ćomplain about the problem of legitimacy. Not all the arguments the 
Dutch electorate used to vote against the Constitution were directly linked to the 
Constitution itself, but most ófthem displayed a distrust or cynicism towards Europę. 
There are no indicators that this problem will just fade away by being ignored.
: One way of dealing with this growing discontent about Europę is counterbal- 
ancing it by focusing on the undeniably positive aspects of European Integration.
Positive effects of European Integration for the Netherlands
Looking at the public debate in the Netherlands before and after the referendum, it 
may seem that Europę brings hardly any advantages. Yet, actually, there are many. 
Most importantly, the European Union has several economic advantages. The Neth­
erlands is an extremely open economy. As no other country, the Dutch have profited 
from the integration of the European market and the dismantling of trade barriers. 
Looking at the cumulative growth of trade within tlie European Community, in the 
period 1960-2000, the Dutch export grew by 1485.0%32 (average for the European 
Community for the period was 1292.0%). Ifyou compare this with the growth ofthe 
export to the rest ofthe world in the same period (862.0% for the Netherlands, with 
the European Community’s average of 734.0%), it becomes elear that the export to 
countries within Europę grew much: faster then the export to countries outside 
Europę. European integration is a cnicial determinant for this growth33. The figures 
also show that the Netherlands profited even more from European integration than 
the European average.
The same can be claimed about enlargement ofthe Union. The expansion from 
6 to 27 member states determined the economic growth, as described earlier. It is
31 M. K ranenburg , EU m l in Lissabon nu een punt zetten achter verdrag Lissabon, “NRC-Han- 
delsblad”, 18 October 2007.
*: 32 H. B adinger, F. B reuss, What has determined the Rapid Post-War Growth ofthe Intra-EU Trade?, Feb-
ruary 2003.
33 Ibidem. ■
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interesting therefore that the more recent enlargements were criticised so heavily by 
the Dutch, who focused merely on the eflect it mighthave on the net contribution to ' 
the EU and left aside the. bigger picture of further economic growth resulting firom 
these enlargements. Furthermore, it is because of the enlargements, that the EU is 
now the world’s largest economic and trade bloc.
Another challenge is to dissolve the myth about the Euro. As mentioned be- 
fore, there seems to be a consensus in the Netherlands about the fact that the Euro 
has had a negative influence on the Dutch economy. However, facts about the lower 
inflation rates sińce the introduction of the Euro suggest a different conclusion. 
Shortly after the introduction, the Euro is now the world’s second default currency.
Besides the economic advantages, there are other reasons why the Dutch 
should cherish the EU. Jeremy Rifkin34 póints at the extraordinary accomplishment 
of the European integration. It is unprecedented that within three generations a politi­
cal, economic and cultural cooperation of such a size and form has been established. 
The EU has fulfilled every ambition it had at its establishment. It preserved peace 
and built a strong economy. Robert Kagan deścribes Europę as “[...] a post historical 
paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual 
Peace’”35. It is interesting to see that the admiration for Europę seems to come from 
outside Europę rather then firom within. For a smali member state as the Netherlands 
the advantages mentioned before are especially important. Never in the históiy, has 
the Netherlands experienced such a long time of peace and military stability as in the 
period following the establishment of the European Commiunity. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands still plays a larger political role within Europę than could be expected on 
tlie sheer basis of its size. :
More focus on the benefits and accomplishments of the EU might counterbal- 
ance the complaints. Also the urgency of a strong Europę could be more strongly 
emphasised. After the end of the Cold War, with the implosion of the Soviet Union, 
Európe’s role and position changed, and still continues to change. The United States 
and Europę are no loriger default allies against the Communist enemy. The United 
States uses its unipolar moment to act more unilaterally than it used to during the 
Cold War. On the other hand, Europę has developed a more assertiye attitude to­
wards, and śometimes against, the United States. The political tensions between parts 
of Europę (especially France and Germany) and the United States were fairly visible 
during the first part of the Second War in lraą. Because neither the United States nor 
the European countries thought it in their own interest to have this political conflict 
escalated, it faded away, and it seemingly did not harm fundamentally the long- 
standing friendly relationship. Yet the incident indicates that Europę should prepare 
for a changing balance of power iń global politics. A strong and more strongly united 
Europę would be a better starting point than a Europę that is too preoccupied with 
intemal discussions about futurę integration36.
. 34 J. R i fk i n, The European Dream: How Europę i  Vision o f the Futurę is Quietly Eclipsing the American 
Dream, “Tarcher/Penguin”, August 2004; Europeanen mogen wel een feestje vieren, “Volkskrant”, 17 maart 2007.
35 R. Kagan, Power and weakness, "Policy Review”, June-July 2002.
36 P. C happatte , Self-centeredEuropę, “The Intemational Herald Tribune”, 20 June 2005.
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There is also another reason for an increasing sense of urgency in an efficient 
and strong EU. The most trying problems European countries are facing today are of 
transnational naturę. Therefore, they reąuire intemational cooperation to be dealt 
with. Threats of intemational terrorism, environmental issues and migration are all 
examples of problems that need a European approach rather then an attempt at solv- 
ing at the national level.
So far, the Dutch political establishment has been part ofthe problem and not 
part of the solution. Leaders of political parties are so afraid of losing the popular 
support that they hardly dare to face the people with unpopular ideas or proposals. 
The recent govemments have almost blindly adopted the criticism of the people 
(Europę is too expensive, we have not enough influence in Brussels, the (futurę) 
enlargement alienates us from Europę etc.). In an attempt not to distance tliem from 
the popular vote, the Dutch goyemment transformed from a supportive member State 
into a yery critical and demanding member State. In the meantime, the popular dis- 
content about Europę in the Netherlands only increased. The more assertive position 
ofthe Dutch Goyemment only assured the people that they were right in their criti­
cism. It became yery unfashionable in the Netherlands to focus on the positiye sides 
of the EU and further integrati on.
The current and futurę govemments could invest in Europę by taking a posi­
tion that is not dictated by the fear of losing popular support, but rather by what is 
strategically best for the Netherlands, pointing at the advantages that the EU gives 
the Netherlands. The outcome of public opinion polis shows that there is still suffi- 
cient support for the EU in the Netherlands to back up this strategy.
Besides shówing courage in taking a more constructive pro-EU position, the 
political establishment should also place the EU, and the futurę ofthe EU, on a promi­
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nent position in the political agenda. So far, the political elite got away with paying . 
only marginal attention to this topie. But the discontent displayed at the referen­
dum and the growing importance of the EU demand a more prominent place for 
Europę in Dutch politics.
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